Abstract-We consider the Gaussian multi-receiver wiretap channel and evaluate its secrecy capacity region. This evaluation requires the identification of underlying auxiliary random variables. For this purpose, we first visit the converse proof of the scalar Gaussian broadcast channel, and show that this proof cannot be extended to this secrecy context. The failure of this extension comes from the insufficiency of the entropypower inequality to resolve the ambiguity regarding the auxiliary random variables. Instead, we provide two converse proofs. The first one uses the alternative representation of the mutual information as an integration of the minimum-mean-square-error (MMSE) along with the properties of the MMSE. The second one uses the relationship between the differential entropy and the Fisher information via the de Bruin identity along with the properties of the Fisher information.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider the Gaussian multi-receiver wiretap channel, and provide a converse for its secrecy capacity region. The Gaussian multi-receiver wiretap channel consists of one transmitter, K legitimate receivers, and one eavesdropper'.
The transmitter would like to send independent confidential messages to each user, while the eavesdropper listens to the ongoing communication between the transmitter and the legitimate receivers. Each communication link between the transmitter and the receivers is an additive Gaussian channel.
As we will show in the sequel, any Gaussian multi-receiver wiretap channel can be regarded as a degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel, whose secrecy capacity region is known in a single-letter form [4] - [6] . This single-letter expression involves auxiliary random variables which need to be identified to establish the secrecy capacity region. Since a direct evaluation of this single-letter expression is difficult, an immediate approach might be to obtain computable outer bounds. For the scenario without an eavesdropper, i.e., for the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel, the difficulty of finding the optimal auxiliary random variable was alleviated via a joint use of the entropy-power inequality [7] , [8] and Fano's inequality by Bergmans in [9] , where Bergmans did not use the singleletter formula for the capacity region. Later, El Gamal gave an alternative approach which uses only the entropy-power inequality [7] , [8] to establish the capacity region starting from This work was supported by NSF Grants CCF 04-47613, CCF 05-14846, CNS 07-16311 and CCF 07-29127.
1Throughout this paper, we consider the case K == 2. For generalization to K > 2,~lease refer to [1] , [2] . The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel, i.e., the case where K == 1, was established in [3] . the corresponding single-letter formula [10] . Despite their differences, these two converses have an important common feature, which is that, both of them use the entropy-power inequality [7] , [8] to identify the optimal auxiliary random variable.
As a natural approach, one might try to adopt the converse proof techniques of the scalar Gaussian broadcast channel [9] , [10] to this secrecy context. However, in this paper, we first show that, existing converse techniques for the Gaussian broadcast channel, i.e., the converse proofs of Bergmans [9] and El Gamal [10] , cannot be extended in a straightforward manner to provide a converse proof for the Gaussian multireceiver wiretap channel. In fact, we explicitly show that the main ingredient of these two converses in [9] , [10] , which is the entropy-power inequality [7] , [8] , is not sufficient to conclude a converse for the secrecy capacity region.
Though the entropy-power inequality is insufficient to provide a converse proof for the Gaussian multi-receiver wiretap channel, we are able to prove the secrecy capacity region using different techniques. In particular, we provide two converse proofs. The first one uses the connection between the minimum-mean-square-error (MMSE) and the mutual information along with the properties of the MMSE [11] , [12] . In additive Gaussian channels, the Fisher information and the MMSE have a complementary relationship in the sense that one of them determines the other one, and vice versa [13] . Thus, the converse proof relying on the MMSE has a counterpart which replaces the MMSE with the Fisher information in the corresponding converse proof. Hence, the second converse uses the connection between the Fisher information and the differential entropy via the de Bruin identity [7] , [8] along with the properties of the Fisher information.
After the inclusion of this paper into the conference program, we generalized our results presented here. In particular, we establish the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel for the most general case, i.e., when the transmitter and each receiver, including the eavesdropper, is equipped with an arbitrary number of antennas. These new results are reported in [1] , [2] .
II. DEGRADED MULTI-RECEIVER WIRETAP CHANNELS
We first revisit the degraded two-user multi-receiver wiretap channel. This channel consists of one transmitter with an input alphabet X, two legitimate receivers with output alphabets Yk, consider only perfect secrecy rates. The secrecy capacity region is defined as the closure of all achievable rate tuples. The degraded two-user multi-receiver wiretap channel exhibits the following Markov chain to compute the secrecy capacity region explicitly, we need to find the optimal joint distributions of (X, U) in Theorem 1.
The corresponding secrecy capacity region is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2 The secrecy capacity region ofthe two-user Gaussian 8180 wiretap channel is given by the union of the rate pairs (R I , R 2 ) satisfying
where the union is over all a E [0, 1] , and a denotes 1 -a.
The achievability of this region can be shown by selecting (X, U) to be jointly Gaussian in Theorem 1. We focus on the converse proof in the rest of the paper.
(
2) IV. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE ENTROPY-POWER INEQUALITY
where the union is over all probability distributions p (u, x) such that
III. GAUSSIAN MULTI-RECEIVER WIRETAP CHANNEL
The Gaussian multi-receiver wiretap channel is defined by
The secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel was established in [5] , [6] for an arbitrary number of users and in [4] for two users.
where the right-hand side is obtained by using the chain rule, and the Markov chain U~X~(Y I , Y 2 , Z). The expression in the first bracket is maximized by Gaussian X [3] yielding
We now show that a straightforward extension of the existing converse proofs for the Gaussian broadcast channel in [9] , [10] is insufficient to provide a converse proof for the Gaussian multi-receiver wiretap channel. In particular, what we will show is that a stand-alone use of the entropypower inequality [7] , [8] , which is the main tool in the converse proofs of Bergmans [9] and El Gamal [10] , falls short of proving the optimality of Gaussian (X, U) in this secrecy context, as opposed to the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel. For that purpose, we consider El Gamal's converse for the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel. However, since the entropy-power inequality is in a central role for both El Gamal's and Bergmans' converses, the upcoming analysis can be done by using Bergmans' proof as well.
First, we consider the bound on the second user's secrecy rate. Using (4), we have
where the channel input X is subject to a power constraint 
Theorem 1 The secrecy capacity region ofthe degraded twouser multi-receiver wiretap channel is given by the union of the rate tuples (R I,R 2 ) satisfying
Since the correlations among N I , N 2 , N z have no effect on the secrecy capacity region, we can adjust the correlation structure to ensure that the following Markov chain is satisfied (9) Thus, this channel can be considered as a degraded channel, and its secrecy capacity region is given by Theorem 1. Hence, 
which will result in the desired bound on (18), i.e., the desired end-result in (10) . We now check whether (22) holds under the constraint given in (19). To this end, consider the difference of mutual informations in (19)
where the inequality is obtained by using the entropy-power inequality. Since the right-hand side of (21) We now give the converse. We use exactly the same steps from (12) to (17) to establish the bound on the secrecy rate of the second user given in (11) . To bound the secrecy rate of For our converse, we need the following proposition which was proved in [12] .
where the inequality is obtained by using the entropy-power inequality. Now, using the constraint given in (19) in (24), we get~l og ( : : : ;i) -S~log ( 1 -27feJ~~I~)0"~) ) (25) which implies 1 2" log 27fe(aP + 0"1) -S h(ZIU) (26) Thus, as opposed to the inequality that we need to show the optimality of Gaussian signalling via the entropy-power inequality, i.e., the bound in (22), we have an opposite inequality. This discussion reveals that if Gaussian signalling is optimal, then its proof cannot be deduced from a straightforward extension of the converse proofs for the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel in [9] , [10] . Thus, we need a new technique to provide the converse for Theorem 2. We next present two different proofs in the next two sections.
We now provide a converse which uses the connection between the MMSE and the mutual information established in [11] , [12] . In [12] , the authors also give an alternative converse for the scalar Gaussian broadcast channel. Our proof will follow this converse, and generalize it to the context where there are secrecy constraints.
First, we briefly state the necessary background information. Let N be a zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian random variable, and (U,X) be a pair of arbitrarily correlated random variables which are independent of N. The MMSE of X when it is observed through U and yltx + N is (27) As shown in [11] , [12] , the MMSE and the conditional mutual information are related through (13) and (17) in (12) yields the desired bound on R 2 given in (11) .
From now on, we focus on obtaining the bound given in (10) on the first user's secrecy rate. To this end, one needs to solve the following optimization/ max I(X; Y1IU) -I(X; ZIU) (18) 
hen the term I(X; ZIU) is absent in both the objective function and the constraint, as in the case of the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel, the entropy-power inequality [7] , [8] can be used to solve this optimization problem. However, the presence of this term complicates the situation, and a standalone use of the entropy-power inequality [7] , [8] does not seem to be sufficient. To substantiate this claim, let us consider the objective function in (18) (30) (31) the first user, we first restate (17) as and the following definition and the upcoming results regarding the Fisher information can be found in [14] .
I(X; Y2IU)~I(X; ZIU)
=~log (1 + a~) 2 (J"2~l og (1 + ap) 2 (J"1 jl/a~aP == -
Definition 1 Let X, U be arbitrarily correlated random variables with well-defined densities, and f(xlu) be the corresponding conditional density. The conditional Fisher information of X is defined by
where the expectation is over (U, X).
The following conditional form of the Fisher information inequality [8] is proved in [2] . Similarly, the following conditional form of the Cramer-Rao inequality is proved in [2] .
Lemma 2 Let X, U be arbitrarily correlated random variables with well-defined densities. Then, we have
We now note the following complementary relationship between the MMSE and the Fisher information [11] , [13] 
J(XIU) :::-Var(XIU) with equality if (U,X) is jointly Gaussian.
We now provide the conditional form of the de Bruin identity [7] , [8] , which is again proved in [2] .
Lemma 3 Let X, U be arbitrarily correlated random variables withfinite second order moments. Moreover, assume that they are independent of N which is a zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian random variable. Then, we have which itself suggests the existence of an alternative converse which uses the Fisher information instead of the MMSE. We now provide the alternative converse based on the Fisher information. We first bound the secrecy rate of the second user as in the previous section, by following the exact steps from (12) to (17). To bound the secrecy rate of the first user, we first note that
::; -log 1 + ---log 1 + -
here (37) follows from (31) and (32), and (38) is due to (34). Since (39) is the desired bound on the secrecy rate of the first user given in (10) , this completes the converse proof. In [1] , [2] , we show that a variant of dirty-paper coding with Gaussian signals is optimal for these channels. To find the secrecy capacity region of the most general case in (57)-(58), we first obtain the secrecy capacity region of the degraded case, and raise this result to the general case by using channel enhancement and some limiting arguments [1] , [2] . Our main contribution is the way we provide the converse proof for the degraded case, for which the Fisher information matrix plays a central role, as its scalar form did here. 
50)
We remind that we had already fixed the left-hand side of this inequality in (17). Comparison of (50) and (17) -aP + t*'
At this point, we compare the inequalities in (34) and (51). These two inequalities imply each other through (44) after appropriate change of variables and by noting that J(aX) ==
(1/a 2 )J (X ) [14] . We now find the desired bound on the secrecy rate of the first user via using the inequality in (51) where (46) (17), and (55) is due to (51). Since (56) provides the desired bound on the secrecy rate of which follows from Lemma 3. We now bound the integrand in (45). For that purpose, we introduce two independent zeromean unit-variance Gaussian random variables N', N", which are also independent of (X, U). Then, we bound the integrand in (45) as follows
